The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American LBJ was looking for a pretext to go to Congress to ask for a resolution that would give him the authority to do basically whatever the hell he wanted to do in Vietnam, without the intense public debate that a declaration of war would have required, says historian Chris Oppe. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. After the war, Hanoi officials not only acknowledged the event but deemed it important enough to designate its date, Aug. 2, as the Vietnamese Navy's Anniversary Day, "the day our heroic naval forces went out and chased away Maddox and Turner Joy." At this point, U.S. involvement in Vietnam remained largely in the background. Perhaps that is the most enduring lesson from Americas use of SIGINT in the Vietnam War in general and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in particular. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in combating unconventional opponents and the potential consequences of relying too heavily on a single source of intelligence. Early Military Career ." Signals Intelligence is a valuable source but it is not perfect. Navy, Of course, none of this was known to Congress, which demanded an explanation for the goings-on in the Tonkin Gulf. Moises book, however, was based on only the few SIGINT reports he was able to obtain through the Freedom of Information Act. 14. Two nearly identical episodes six weeks apart; two nearly opposite responses. The 122 additional relevant SIGINT products confirmed that the Phu Bai station had misinterpreted or mistranslated many of the early August 3 SIGINT intercepts. Subscribe to LBJ's War onApple Podcasts. Despite this tremendous uncertainty, by midafternoon, the discussion among Johnson and his advisers was no longer about whether to respondbut how. Each sides initial after-action review was positive. Shortly after ordering the airstrikes, Johnson went on television and addressed the nation regarding the incident. Lyndon Johnson on August 5, 1964, assertedly in reaction to two WebThe Gulf of Tonkin While Kennedy had at least the comforting illusion of progress in Vietnam (manufactured by Harkins and Diem), Johnson faced a starker picture of confusion, disunity, and muddle in Saigon and of a rapidly growing Viet Cong in the countryside. LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. President Johnson himself apparently questioned the sailorsu0019 report of an attack. These secret intelligence-gathering missions and sabotage operations had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961, but in January 1964, the program was transferred to the Defense Department under the control of a cover organization called the Studies and Observations Group (SOG). The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. Then North Vietnams naval authorities either became confused or were seized by indecision. Thus, the South Vietnamese raid on Hon Me Island, a major North Vietnamese infiltration staging point, became the tripwire that set off the August 2 confrontation in the Gulf of Tonkin. It is not NSA's intention to prove or The truth about 'False Flags' from Nazi Germany to the Vietnam War You've read 1 out of 5 free articles of Naval History this month. This was the first of several carefully worded official statements aimed at separating 34A and Desoto and leaving the impression that the United States was not involved in the covert operations.9 Two days later, August 4, Maddox returned to the area, supported by the destroyer Turner Joy (DD-951). To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. In an effort to increase pressure on North Vietnam, several Norwegian-built fast patrol boats (PTFs) were covertly purchased and transferred to South Vietnam. The Taliban silenced him. The Science of Conspiracy Theories - Gulf of Tonkin conspiracy The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History Arguing that he did not seek a "wider war," Johnson stated the importance of showing that the United States would "continue to protect its national interests." Case Closed: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - HistoryNet The only opposition came from a few scattered machine guns on shore, but they did no damage. Unlike much else that followed, this incident is undisputed, although no one from the US government ever admitted publicly that the attack was likely provoked by its covert actions. In fact, the North Vietnamese were trying to avoid contact with U.S. forces on August 4, and they saw the departure of the Desoto patrol ships as a sign that they could proceed to recover their torpedo boats and tow them back to base. Not reported at the time, Herrick instructed his gun crews to fire three warning shots if the North Vietnamese came within 10,000 yards of the ship. After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking further action, he radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." WebCongress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution before the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. McNamara and the JCS believed that this intercept decisively provided the smoking gun of the second attack, and so the president reported to the American people and Congress. He also requested air support. Despite McNamaras nimble answers, North Vietnams insistence that there was a connection between 34A and the Desoto patrols was only natural. That very night, the idea was put to the test. WebUnderground Knowledge host James Morcan discloses what really happened in 1964's Gulf of Tonkin Incident which started the Vietnam War. Cruising twenty-eight miles offshore in international waters, Maddox was approached by the North Vietnamese. 9. 4. Message, COMUSMACV 291233Z July 1964, CP 291345Z July 1964. The United States denied involvement. The entirety of the original intercepts, however, were not examined and reanalyzed until after the war. . Forty-five minutes after beginning their attack, the commandos withdrew. 17. Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. Subsequent SIGINT reporting and faulty analysis that day further reinforced earlier false impressions. Carl Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 10 years of experience as a surface line officer. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 A National Security Agency report released in 2007 reveals unequivocally that the alleged Aug. 4, 1964, attack by North Vietnam on U.S. destroyers never actually happened. In November of 2001, the LBJ Presidential library and museum released tapes of phone conversations with the President and then Defense 2. Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964, FRUS 1964, vol. A subsequent review of the SIGINT reports revealed that this later interceptMcNamaras smoking gunwas in fact a follow-on, more in-depth report of the August 2 action. Ogier then opened fire at 1508 hours, when the boats were only six minutes from torpedo range. Returning fire, Maddox scored hits on the P-4s while being struck by a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun bullet. In the first few days of August 1964, a series of events off the coast of North Vietnam and decisions made in Washington, D.C., set the United States on a course that would largely define the next decade and weigh heavily on American foreign policy to this day. Suddenly, North Vietnamese guns opened fire from the shore. Just after midnight on 31 July, PTF-2 and PTF-5, commanded by Lieutenant Huyet, arrived undetected at a position 800 yards northeast of the island. One element of American assistance to South Vietnam included covert support for South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnams coastal transportation facilities and networks. Shortly after taking office following the death of President John F. Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson became concerned about South Vietnam's ability to fend off the Communist Viet Cong guerillas that were operating in the country. Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration Based on the intercepts, Captain John J. Herrick, the on-scene mission commander aboard nearby Turner Joy, decided to terminate Maddoxs Desoto patrol late on August 1, because he believed he had indications the ship was about to be attacked.. The errors made in the initial analysis were due to a combination of inexperience, limited knowledge of North Vietnams operations and an operational imperative to ensure that the U.S. Navy ships would not be caught by surprise. But in the pre-dawn hours of July 31, 1964, U.S.-backed patrol boats shelled two North No one was hurt and little damage wasdone in the attack, but intercepted cables suggested a second attack might be imminent. But only a few minutes later, McNamara was back on the line with news of a second incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN THE GULF OF TONKIN? Herricks concerns grew as the SIGINT intercepts indicated that the North Vietnamese were concentrating torpedo boats off Hon Me Island, 25 nautical miles to his southwest. Then they boarded their boats and headed back to Da Nang.12 In the end the Navy agreed, and in concert with MACV, took steps to ensure that "34A operations will be adjusted to prevent interference" with Desoto patrols.7 This did not mean that MACV did not welcome the information brought back by the Desoto patrols, only that the two missions would not actively support one another. A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. Although Washington officials did not believe Hanoi would attack the Desoto ships again, tensions ran high on both sides, and this affected their respective analyses of the events to come. 14. To increase the chances of success, SOG proposed increased raids along the coast, emphasizing offshore bombardment by the boats rather than inserting commandos. Until 1964, Desoto patrols stayed at least 20 miles away from the coast. IV-2 to IV-4. The North Vietnamese did not react, probably because no South Vietnamese commando operations were underway at that time. Thats what all the country wants, because Goldwater's raising so much hell about how he's gonna blow 'em off the moon, and they say that we oughtn't to do anything that the national interest doesn't require. The study debunks two strongly held but opposing beliefs about what happened on both dayson the one hand that neither of the reported attacks ever took place at all, and on the other that there was in fact a second deliberate North Vietnamese attack on August 4. We still seek no wider war.. More important, they did not know the North Vietnamese had begun to react more aggressively to the commando raids. Whether they produced battlefield images of the dead or daguerreotype portraits of common soldiers, []. Vaccines. The rounds set some of the buildings ablaze, keeping the defenders off balance. Herrick requested aerial reconnaissance for the next morning to search for the wreckage of the torpedo boats he thought he had sunk. This article is based on the PRI podcast, LBJ's War, hosted by David Brown. Originally begun by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, 34A was a highly-classified program of covert operations against North Vietnam. This along with flawed signals intelligence from the National Security Agency led Johnson to order retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam. Within the year, U.S. bombers would strike North Vietnam, and U.S. ground units would land on South Vietnamese soil. 10. While I was in training, my motivation was to get these wings and I wear them today proudly, the airman recalled in 2015. One 12.7mm machine bullet hit Maddox before the boats broke off and started to withdraw. Subscribe to receive our weekly newsletter with top stories from master historians. Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964. Suffice to say here that the version as presented here by Marolda and Fitzgerald is highly credible and completely plausible, and I for one am persuaded of its correctness. However, unlike the good old days when -- as the wizened cynical Frenchmen put it, history was a lie agreed-on -- no longer can governments after the battle simply set down how it went and that is that. The people who are calling me up, they want to be damned sure I don't pull 'em out and run, and they want to be damned sure that we're firm. Senator Wayne Morse (D-OR) challenged the account, and argued that despite evidence that 34A missions and Desoto patrols were not operating in tandem, Hanoi could only have concluded that they were. Conspiracy FACT #8: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - YouTube Not all wars are made for navies, and the U.S. Navy had to insinuate itself into the Vietnam one and carve out a role. President Johnson ordered a halt to all 34A operations "to avoid sending confusing signals associated with recent events in the Gulf of Tonkin." He readthe chiefs a cable from the captain of the Maddox. In Saigon, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor objected to the halt, saying that "it is my conviction that we must resume these operations and continue their pressure on North Vietnam as soon as possible, leaving no impression that we or the South Vietnamese have been deterred from our operations because of the Tonkin Gulf incidents." In the meantime, aboard Turner Joy, Captain Herrick ordered an immediate review of the nights actions. At the time, the Navy relied heavily on Naval Support Group Activity (NSGA), San Miguel, Philippines, for SIGINT support, augmented by seaborne SIGINT elements called Direct Support Units (DSUs). Then, everyones doubts were swept away when a SIGINT intercept from one of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats reported the claim that it had shot down two American planes in the battle area. That night, on national television, Johnson addressedthe American people, saying,Renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to take action and reply. Even in the darkness, the commandos could see their targeta water tower surrounded by a few military buildings. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin and the Vietnam War. These warning shots were fired and the P-4s launched a torpedo attack. Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the NSC, 4 August 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m.. 13. SOG took the mounting war of words very seriously and assumed the worstthat an investigation would expose its operations against the North. Operation Fast and Furious 10 The after-action reports from the participants in the Gulf arrived in Washington several hours after the report of the second incident. Both the Phu Bai station and Maddoxs DSU knew the boats had orders to attack an enemy ship., Not knowing about the South Vietnamese commando raid, all assumed that Maddox was the target. Senator Morse was one of the dissenters. Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident. We have no intention of yielding to pressure.